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I.

Introduction

As one of four contributors to an issue celebrating Christopher
Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager's Religious Freedom and the Constitution,1 I
have chosen to write an Essay that differs from an ordinary review. I
compare the authors' approach with two other recent formulations of what
should be central for the jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses. Since I have
recently published my own treatment of the Free Exercise Clause, 2 and a second volume on the Establishment Clause is in the pipeline toward
publication,3 I do not here present my own positive views (though I provide
references for interested readers). Those views might be capsulized as a
broad defense of the Supreme Court's traditional "no hindrance-no aid"
approach to the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses-a defense that
rejects a fair amount of what the Court has actually decided but also rejects
the idea that some simplifying conceptual approach can best guide adjudication in this sensitive domain. Thus, although I believe we can learn much
from the three approaches I discuss here, I resist claims that any of them
would alone produce just decisions about the legal treatment of religion in
the United States.
Before I undertake my main effort, I do want to offer a few "review"
comments. Religious Freedom and the Constitution is beautifully written
and consistently interesting. Building on earlier articles by Eisgruber and

t Provost and Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Public Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson
School and the University Center for Human Values, Princeton University.
+ Dean, John Jeffers Research Chair in Law, and Alice Jane Drysdale Sheffield Regents Chair
in Law, The University of Texas School of Law.
* University Professor, Columbia University School of Law.
1. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION (2007).
2. 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS
(2006) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, FREE EXERCISE].
3. 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: NONESTABLISHMENT AND
FAIRNESS (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, NONESTABLISHMENT].
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Sager,4 and on constitutional threads of equality, it offers the most detailed
and sophisticated argument for treating religious claims similarly with
analogous nonreligious claims. One of the joys of the book for any serious
student of the Religion Clauses is its conscientious attempt to address objections to its central thesis. In this respect, the authors fulfill what I believe is a
responsibility of careful scholars. Although I shall suggest that they are not
always fully successful in facing and meeting criticisms, nevertheless their
efforts are a model for others who wish to engage intellectual opponents.
This Essay appraises three comprehensive approaches to Religious
Clause principles: (1) that, as Eisgruber and Sager contend, governments
should respect Equal Liberty-comprised of principles of nondiscrimination,
nonpreferentialism, and broad liberty; (2) that governments should avoid influencing choices about religion insofar as possible; and (3) that governments
should be relatively free to engage in symbolic displays but should observe a
strict institutional separation from religious organizations. Each of these
approaches, proposed by prominent scholars of the Religion Clauses,
deserves careful consideration. It is partly by identifying some strengths and
weaknesses of these approaches that we can evaluate the efforts, sometimes
stumbling, of the Supreme Court over the years. I shall treat the Eisgruber
and Sager approach last and most extensively; it seems to me the most
appealing outright competitor to the more eclectic approach I support.
II.

No Influence or Substantive Neutrality

One approach to the Religion Clauses is that the government should aim
to influence choices about religion as little as possible. Judge Michael
McConnell has written that the government should aim for a "hypothetical
world in which individuals make decisions about religion on the basis of5
their own religious conscience, without the influence of government."
Douglas Laycock has urged that "religion is to be left as wholly to private
choices as anything can be. It should proceed as unaffected by government
as possible.",6 The basic idea that government should not interfere with religious choices is attractive, and it could, depending on context, justify both
particular exemptions and particular disabilities for religion. The exemptions

4. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience:
The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 (1994)
[hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager, Vulnerability]; Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional,69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994).
5. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 169
(1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Crossroads]. In a different article, McConnell says that "the
ultimate purposes of the Religion Clauses [are] to ensure that religion, as nearly as possible, is free
from government control or influence, whether favorable or unfavorable." Michael W. McConnell,
The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAuL L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) [hereinafter McConnell,
Singling Out].
6. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward Religion, 39
DEPAuL L. REV. 993, 1002 (1990).
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would redress what would otherwise be negative effects on religious choices.
The disabilities would counter what might amount to an undue preference for
some religious perspectives or for religion in general. Thus, a state might be
able to single out other educational fields, such as medicine or social work,
for special financial aid, but it could not decide to fund education for the
ministry alone. Such funding would push people toward choices in favor of
organized religion and would inevitably favor some forms of ministry over
others. For similar reasons, a state could not teach particular religious doctrines as true in its schools, though it could teach the truth of particular views
in virtually every other domain of human concern.
This approach treats religion as special. Depending on just how it is
developed, it could correspond well or poorly with present or past Supreme
Court doctrine. 7 For example, in respect to free exercise, were an advocate
of "no government influence" to place on legislatures the main burden of
determining what exemptions to grant, his view could fit the Court's jurisprudence after Employment Division v. Smith,8 the decision that (with
qualifications) eliminates any constitutional right to be exempted on religious
grounds from the application of general laws. 9 Were someone to follow
McConnell and Laycock in regarding many exemptions as matters of con-

stitutional right, to be enforced by courts,' 0 his approach would resonate
much better with pre-Smith law. 1
Eisgruber and Sager criticize this approach as providing no genuine
guidance-in light of all government does, "what could it mean for religion
'to proceed as unaffected by government as possible?'-and as seeming to
condemn desirable government policies, such as discouraging racism, that
will influence religious understanding. 12 This "no guidance" critique is
overstated, but it does require us to look carefully at alternatives that the
general formulation of "no influence" tends to obscure.
Some years ago, a faculty colleague told me that parents should expose
their children to the widest spectrum of views about religion so that the
children could make their own choices about what to believe. Parents would
not regularly take their children to their own houses of worship, if they have

7. Similarly, it could or could not correspond fairly well with the approaches to particular issues
that I embrace.
See GREENAWALT, FREE EXERCISE, supra note 2; GREENAWALT,
NONESTABLISHMENT, supra note 3.

8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. Id. at 890 (holding that an Oregon law prohibiting the use of peyote does not violate the Free
Exercise Clause when applied to those whose religious practices require such use).
10. See Laycock, supra note 6, at 1016 ("If we take seriously the constitutional right to freely
exercise religion, we must restore a judicially enforceable right to religious exemption in
appropriate cases."); McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 5, at 2-3 (defending religious exemptions
from generally applicable laws as a matter of constitutional right and arguing that religion should be
"singled out" for special constitutional protection).
11. The approach would then better fit my own views, which are critical of Smith. See
GREENAWALT, FREE EXERCISE, supra note 2, at 77-83.
12. EiSGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 28.
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one; rather, they would treat all perspectives equally. I regarded this view as
na~ive, and may now be stating it less sympathetically than would its
proponent, but it was a proposal that parents should aim to have their
children as unaffected by their own religious convictions and as free to make
independent choices about religion as possible.
Of course, complete success in this endeavor would be unimaginable.
Parents' behavior in many respects is related to their religious convictions,
and even choices they may perceive as nonreligious, such as whether to treat
sons and daughters equally, could affect the attractiveness of various
religions for their children. Further, the very fact of growing up in a nuclear
family with two parents could well influence a child's choice of religion.
Nevertheless, the suggestion that parents should be neutral is starkly at odds
with how most parents act, and we can see how acceptance of that view
could affect parental behavior. In a roughly similar way, I think that the suggestion of no influence can, to a degree, guide government actions.
Clearly the basic notion cannot be attempting to create conditions of
choice like those people would have were there no government whatsoever,
any more than the guide to parents could be to attempt to create conditions
like those that would exist were the children to have no parents. 13 Rather, the
idea must be that basic functions of government would be taken for granted
and that within that context the aspiration would be freedom of choice. Such
an approach does require a degree of judgment about what is to be taken for
granted, but that does not necessarily render the approach useless.
A general formulation about "no influence on religious choices"
contains three ambiguities, at least two of which are important for our
purposes. The first ambiguity concerns what count as religious choicesbasic choices about what religion to practice or all choices motivated by
religion. The answer of Laycock and McConnell, who discuss discrete
religious acts as well as basic commitments, is that both are covered; people
should be uninfluenced so far as possible in what religion to practice and
they should be able, 14so far as possible, to carry out the actions their religious
consciences call for.
The second ambiguity is whether the state should avoid aiming to
influence or should aim to minimize influence. The political branches of a
13. Laycock writes that treating religion as if government did not exist would be a "conceivable
mechanical standard" with nothing to recommend it other than "intellectual purity." Laycock,
supra note 6, at 1005.
14. See id. at 1001 ("My basic formulation of substantive neutrality is this: the religion clauses
require government to minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious
belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance."); McConnell,
Crossroads, supra note 5, at 194 ("In the modem welfare-regulatory state, [a plurality approach]
means that the state must not favor religion over nonreligion, nonreligion over religion, or one
religion over another in distributing financial resources; that the state must create exceptions to laws
of general applicability when these laws threaten the religious convictions or practices of religious
institutions or individuals; and that the state should eschew both religious favoritism and secular
bias in its own participation in the formation of public culture.").
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government could adopt as one realistic aspiration not to aim to influence
people's religious views and actions. And fulfillment of this aspiration might
be enforced by judicial review. Were only this much required, a government,
operating on objectives that had nothing to do with influencing religious
choices, could proceed without worrying about unintended effects on those
choices. Alternatively, governments could make an effort to avoid or counter
unintended effects. 1 5 According to this view, governments should sometimes
grant religious exemptions, such as allowing worshipers to use peyote, even
though the restrictions for which the exemptions are needed were not adopted
with an aim to affect religious choice. Laycock and McConnell definitely
16
assume that governments should sometimes counter unintended effects.
But how does one decide whether, in the circumstances, it is sufficient
for a government not to aim to influence religious choice or whether it needs
to counter unintended effects? Laycock draws an analogy to affirmative
action; he comments that Americans agree that whether equal opportunity
and equal treatment, on the one hand, or equal impact and equal outcomes,
on the other, are appropriate depends on context, but people often disagree
over which is the relevant measure. 17 He acknowledges that his position,
which he labels "substantive neutrality," requires "judgments about the relative significance of various encouragements and discouragements to
religion."'" Thus, since few will join a religion for an occasional sip of wine,
and sacramental use of wine is very important for some Jews and Christians,
a ban on drinking alcohol should include an exemption.' 9 On the other hand,
the encouragement to religion created by a religious exemption from paying
taxes would be great; thus, equal treatment in the sense of no exemption is
the right approach.2 °
The third ambiguity involves the relation between the no influence
standard and political and legal decisions about the relevance of the Religion
Clauses. That standard could be the key to what decision to make; it could at
least be a total account of Religion Clause values; it could be one side of a
balance for final decision; or, most modestly, it could be only one important
consideration suggested by the Religion Clauses.
If the only no influence requirement for the state was to avoid aiming to
influence religious choices, one could claim that this standard should always

15. 1 discuss this option in respect to public school education in KENT GREENAWALT, DOES
GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 32-33 (2005).

16. See Laycock, supra note 6, at 1003 (explaining, for example, why a prohibition of alcohol
should make an exemption for sacramental wine); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1137 (1990) (criticizing Smith for
relying on principles of "facial neutrality" and "generally applicability" because the First
Amendment "singles out [religious conduct] for particular protection").
17. Laycock, supra note 6, at 997.
18. Id. at 1004.
19. Id. at 1003-04.
20. Id. at 1016-17.
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be followed. Decisions about laws and policies could be made on various
grounds, but an aim to influence religion should never be among them. At
least if one could divide concrete choices, like whether to forbid snakehandling, into permitted reduction of physical risk and prohibited aims to
discourage a religion, one could think that no influence (in this limited sense)
provides a full answer to whether the state's involvement offends the
Religion Clauses.
Once one suggests that the state should also avoid unintended influence,
the matter becomes much more complicated. Consider a law against
handling snakes. The state says it doesn't want to interfere with religious
choices; it just wants to protect people from dying. But the law, if enforced,
will influence both what actions people undertake on religious grounds and
what religions they accept. The same is true about laws that require parents
to take very ill children to doctors and authorize punishment of parents
whose children die because they fail to seek medical help, even if religious
conviction leads them to oppose ordinary medical care. Given the incentives
people have to not handle poisonous snakes and to seek medical care for their
children, religiously based privileges to handle snakes and decline medical
care would not provide much positive encouragement to join the religions
such privileges would benefit. Laws supporting military endeavors and
challenging racial discrimination also affect religious choices. (With respect
to support of the military and laws against racial discrimination, it might be
said that a failure to act would favor pacifist and segregationist religions.)
For these subjects, the caution about "no effect or influence" can only
be one side of the balance, telling us whether or not something is being
sacrificed in terms of the government's relation to religion, but not whether a
law overall is justified. Once we understand that no influence in this sense is
often only one side of a balance, we will see that it alone cannot resolve
many controversies, which will turn on the strength of government justifications for restrictions that undeniably will have some influence on religious
choices, and more of such influence than would removal of the restrictions.
Judge McConnell has at times proposed fairly libertarian answers to
such issues--education ideally would be in private schools chosen by
parents,2 1 protecting adults from themselves would not be a legitimate basis
to interfere with religiously motivated behavior,22 economic considerations
typically should not outweigh claims of religious freedom 23-but the no

21. Michael W. McConnell, Education Disestablishment: Why Democratic Values Are IllServed by Democratic Control of Schooling, in MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION 87, 87-97
(Stephen Macedo &Yael Tamir eds., 2002).
22. See Michael W. McConnell, Taking Religious Freedom Seriously, FIRST THINGS, May
1990, at 30, 34 (stating that protecting religious minorities' First Amendment rights will sometimes
require protection of practices society considers repugnant).
23. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 37-38, 54
(explaining that the legislature need not necessarily yield religious claims to economic needs and
vice versa).
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influence standard alone does not get us there. And
Laycock has a more
24
expansive understanding of government's proper role.
Even if the no influence view does not purport to say when its
injunction may be overridden by other considerations unrelated to religion, it
does apparently claim to encapsulate relevant Religion Clause values. This, I
believe, is mistaken. There are concerns about government interference with
religion and religious intrusion on government that are not reducible to the
desirability of avoiding influences on religious choice. The problem with
churches making final decisions about liquor licenses in Larkin v. Grendel's
Den25 was not mainly about government influencing religious choice. And
government drawing political lines on religious criteria 26 is troubling even if
it arguably promotes rather than retards religious choice. Finally, although
protecting free religious choice is one of the reasons why courts should refrain from deciding cases on the basis of determinations of religious doctrine,
many other reasons also support the courts not entering into this particular
thicket.27
In summary, the notion of no influence is often an uncertain guide,
partly because officials must decide whether in context they should aim for
equal treatment or equal result. Further, the criterion often captures only one
side of a delicate balance of relevant considerations. Even more important,
although it does loosely mark one significant factor under the Religion
Clauses, that standard slights other factors that should be relevant to their
interpretation.
II.

Symbolic Feast and Institutional Famine

With a rich sense of early American history and with practical
experience trying to help Iraq develop a constitution that would give special
recognition to Islam, Noah Feldman has proposed a regime for the law of the
Establishment Clause that is decidedly contrarian in light of recent
developments. 28 The Court has moved toward acceptance of substantial
public money flowing to religious institutions so long as the rationale for

24. See Laycock, supra note 6, at 1001-06, 1011-18 (defining the "substantive neutrality"
standard, and providing examples of its application).
25. 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (holding invalid a Massachusetts statute that vested churches and
schools with the power to veto applications for liquor licenses within 500 feet of a church or
school).
26. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994) (holding that the
"allocation of political power on a religious criterion" violates the Establishment Clause). I should
note that McConnell thinks the case was wrongly decided. Michael W. McConnell, Comment,
Institutions and Interpretation:A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, Ill HARV. L. REV. 153, 192
n.220 (1997).
27. See GREENAWALT, FREE EXERCISE, supra note 2, at 261-89 (considering the involvement
of secular courts in settling disputes over church property and concluding that it is desirable to
"keep courts out of determining ecclesiastical matters for which they are ill suited").
28. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED By GOD 9, 211-12, 237-38 (2005).

1224

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 85:1217

funding is a nonreligious secular benefit, such as education 29 or hospital care,
and the criteria for funding do not make reference to religion.3 ° Over the
same period, the Court has been fairly strict in not allowing devotional prac32
tices in schools 3 1 and government-sponsored displays of religious symbols.
Feldman's proposal is to reverse these directions. He would permit more
religious expressions by government, eliminating any requirement that a law
or practice have a secular purpose and not endorse religion,33 and he would
require strict institutional separation.34 He defends his proposal as consonant
with the history of the Establishment Clause and as a healthy compromise
given the split in our society between what he calls "legal secularists" and
"values evangelicals. ' 35
According to Feldman, liberty of conscience was the dominating
concept underlying the Religion Clauses, 36 and people at the time of the
founding regarded coercion to contribute money to religious endeavors as a
serious violation of conscience.3 7 With their overriding concern about direct
coercion, they were not disturbed by the government's employment of religious imagery. 38 And when public schools developed in the early nineteenth
century, no one supposed that "nonsectarian" devotional practices and
teaching, which were effectively nonsectarian Protestant, offended some
principle of nonestablishment. 39 Like many historical studies of the Religion
Clauses, Feldman is comparatively neglectful of attitudes about
establishment when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted (the

29. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 640-41 (2002) (holding that Ohio's school
voucher program does not violate the Establishment Clause because it serves a valid secular purpose
in promoting education and is neutral toward religion in that it provides aid to religious institutions
only as a result of private choices).
30. See id. at 667 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the Medicare and Medicaid programs
provide substantial aid to religiously affiliated medical facilities).
31. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587-99 (1992) (holding that a public school's
inclusion of a "non-sectarian" prayer read by a clergyman during its graduation ceremony violates
the Establishment Clause).
32. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (holding that the display of
the Ten Commandments at the county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause). But see Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (holding that the display of a Ten Commandments
monument on the state capital grounds did not violate the Establishment Clause).
33. FELDMAN, supra note 28, at 237.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 237-38.
36. Id. at 12, 27-33.
37. Feldman writes at one point of the protection of religious dissenters "against compelled
taxation to support teachings with which they disagreed." Id. at 12. But some influential objections
were broader than that, covering all compelled taxation to support religion. Id. at 32-37.
38. Id. at 50-51.
39. Id. at 61-65. The issue, of course, was not whether these practices within states violated the
federal Establishment Clause, which at that stage did not apply against the states, but whether these
practices were or were not regarded as establishments of religion. See id. at 66 (recounting Catholic
arguments "that paying taxes to support religious teachings with which one disagrees violates the
liberty of conscience").
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constitutional act that made the Clauses applicable against the states), but his
treatment of views about public schools and of opposition to financing
parochial schools strongly suggest that he does not think attitudes about
public expressions and financial aid had changed.4 °
The more serious question about his historical argument is about the
nature of the funding that members of the founding generation believed
would violate conscience. The funding to which they objected was aid given
to support clergy and other religious purposes. 4' Contrary to what Justice
Thomas claimed in the case requiring that the University of Virginia fund the
printing of an evangelical Christian publication,42 it is hardly apparent from
James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance that his concern was restricted to taxation and funding that was directed specifically to religious
endeavors, but that is what Madison and others were thinking about.43 One
cannot be entirely confident what principles the early opponents of funding
of religion would have embraced had they conceived a welfare state in which
religious and nonreligious private organizations provide vital social services
that might or might not be assisted by government.
In any event, Feldman's primary reliance is on the desirability of his
approach in the modem context. Here we may distinguish an argument about
political prudence from one about intrinsic wisdom. The country is now
sharply split, he writes, between legal secularists and values evangelicals. 44
The former do not, like early secularists, condemn the practice of religion
itself,45 but they do want to remove it from legal and political life. 46 The val-

ues evangelicals do not, in the main, want public reliance on any particular
religion, but they do want recognition of traditional values resting on a broad
religious base.4 7 Both groups are seeking a kind of unity in the religious

40. See id. at 71-85 (tracking the controversy over "the twin issues of Catholic education and
the Bible in schools [that] resurface[d]" after the Civil War, and the debate over the Blaine
Amendment).
41. Feldman asserts that "[t]he framers meant the Establishment Clause primarily to guard
against the possibility that a citizen's tax dollars would be used to support religious teachings" even
if those funds were generally available for other speech. Id. at 209. However, John Witte, Jr. has
written that Madison and other Framers, though proposing a separationist ideal, "did not press this
logic to absolutist conclusions-particularly when it came to 'adiaphora' or nonessentials of churchstate relations."

John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American

Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 383 (1996).
42. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 853-56 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring). Feldman comments that the Court in Rosenberger adopted "a position
almost squarely the opposite of the original intent of the Establishment Clause." FELDMAN, supra
note 28, at 209.
43. JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (June 20,
1785), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 29 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
44. FELDMAN, supra note 28, at 6-8.
45. Id. at 113-30.
46. Id. at 8.
47. Id. at6-7, 13-14, 188, 194,229.
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diversity of modem society.
Allowing greater expressions of religion
would grant the values evangelicals what they most care about, that is,
cultural recognition of religion, whereas strong institutional separation would
give the legal secularists what they most care about, avoiding a mixture of
public authorities and religious groups. 49 Feldman presents his proposal as
one which members of both competing factions might recognize as a reasonable compromise and which might find its way into constitutional doctrine. 50
Feldman also provides reasons for his proposal that one can divorce
from the present competition between legal secularists and values
evangelicals. Funding of religious endeavors is particularly likely to be
divisive in society.5' Moderate religious expressions by government, such as
creches in public squares, are relatively innocuous.
While Feldman was
growing up as a Jew, reminders that he lived in a Christian country did not
make him feel uncomfortable;5 3 the manner in which members of minority
religions regard expressions of a majority faith is a question of their
"interpretive choice" whether to feel excluded.54
Perhaps the omission is defensible in a broad proposal, as compared
with a comprehensive plan, but Feldman is not very precise about which
religious expressions by government he would allow and which he would not
allow. 55 And, focusing mainly on the circumstance of religious schools, he
sounds as if he would not permit any substantial funding of such schools, yet
in a highly compressed treatment he draws back from such a conclusion
about most religiously sponsored charities, suggesting rather that aid should
not go to those "that rely on faith to accomplish their goals. ' '56 Certainly
some religious schools could argue that they do not rely on faith to accomplish their goals. A stricter restriction on aid to schools than to other
charities could be defended on the ground that the government needs to be
especially careful about instruction in religion and that public schools have
been such a unifying force in American life, but Feldman does not explain
why he would be stricter about aid to schools than other social services (if,
indeed, that is his position).

48. Id. at 8, 220.
49. See id. at 218 (stating that "legal secularists have failed to hold the line on the ban of
government funding for religion, the cornerstone of early legal secularism" while "[v]alues
evangelicals have simultaneously found themselves frustrated in the symbolic sphere about which
they care most").
50. Id. at 236-37.
51. Id. at 15, 238.
52. Id. at 240-42.
53. Id. at 16-17.
54. Id. at 242.
55. He would "allow public religion where it is inclusive, not exclusive, and.., religious
displays and prayers so long as they accommodate and honor religious diversity." Id. at 15-16.
56. Id. at 247.
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Another blemish in Feldman's account is his suggestion that a voucher
plan must (to be constitutional) allow the teaching of unacceptable values,
such as racism and sexism. 57 Although Feldman is right that certain
judgments about good and bad values would be constitutionally foreclosed as
criteria for state aid, he exaggerates the scope of these limits. Courts will
allow states to set some conditions on the ideas schools receiving financial
support may teach, as Ohio required that schools receiving voucher money in
Cleveland not teach hatred of groups classified by race, religion, nationality,
or ethnic background.58
A more substantial flaw in Feldman's analysis is his conjoining of the
question of public religious expressions by government with the question of
whether citizens and officials may employ religious premises in deciding
what laws to enact. 59 He overstates considerably when he generalizes that
"legal secularists are in favor of a constitutional rule under which the fact
that supporters have invoked religion in support of a bill in Congress could
disqualify that bill from taking effect as law." 60 Feldman correctly says that
some secularists have suggested that laws based dominantly on religious
premises violate the Establishment Clause, and he points to the religious purpose prong of the Lemon test. 6' What he does not say is that few scholars
think that a moderate degree of expressed support based on religious premises would make a law invalid, that the courts have been very hesitant to find
religious purposes when nonreligious purposes are also present, and that the
Supreme Court has never declared that every kind of reliance on religious
premises constitutes a religious purpose. 6 2 In any event, because religious
premises mix with nonreligious ones for, and among, individuals who support proposed laws, the likelihood is slim that courts will declare laws
unconstitutional simply because people relied on religious convictions and
expressed that reliance in public discourse.
To be clear, insofar as Feldman takes the view that reliance on religious
convictions in political discourse and judgments is often appropriate, he and I

57. Id. at 244-46.
58. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644-45 (2002).
59. See FELDMAN, supra note 28, at 221-23 (arguing that legal secularists believe "decisions
should be made on the basis of nonreligious reasoning, and the actions that... government takes
should not reflect religious values").
60. Id. at 223.
61. Id.; see also Lemon v.Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (requiring under the purpose
prong of the three-part establishment test that a "statute must have a secular legislative purpose").
62. 1 argue in Chapters 23 and 24 of GREENAWALT, NONESTABLISHMENT, supra note 3, that it
makes a great deal of difference just how a religious conviction figures in the approval of a law or
policy-that some crucial reliances on religious convictions should not be regarded as religious
purposes, even were there no doubt that every legislator voting for a law relied on just the same
religious conviction in just the same way.
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are in agreement.63 We are also in agreement that the Establishment Clause
has little direct relevance to this problem, especially if one is thinking about
judicial enforcement. What is confusing is his linking of this problem with
expressions that are by the government as such. This linkage confuses in two
respects. First, it obscures the possibility that someone might think constitutional law should lie close to the secularist end of the spectrum as far as
government expressions about religion are concerned but also embrace a
view that is far from that end of the spectrum in respect to reliance on religious premises. My own position for two decades has been that so long as
the objective is not to promote religion, the Constitution permits wide use of
religious premises by individual officials and citizens in support of proposed
laws about subjects like welfare, treatment of animals, and capital
punishment.64
The second confusion lies in the apparent benefits to each side of the
compromise Feldman proposes. He would "give" to the values evangelicals
constitutional acceptance of government expressions about religion and political use of religious premises in return for concessions to the legal
secularists about funding and institutional separation. 65 He does not explain
that although the present law about government expressions is not to the
liking of the values evangelicals, they already have most of what they want
(as far as constitutional law is concerned) regarding political use of religious
convictions. In the main, when officials ask themselves whether to rely upon
and express religious premises, 66 the primary reasons why they might hesitate involve their prudential judgments that a broader nonreligious appeal
will be more effective and their sense of what the political culture deems
appropriate, 67 not a worry that a court might declare a resulting law invalid.
Especially if the kinds of religious expressions in which governments could
engage would be limited ones that are fairly bland or widely inclusive (or
bland and inclusive), the values evangelicals would be getting less out of the
compromise than the legal secularists, who would be assured of serious limits on funding that the Supreme Court has now approved.
Once one cuts through these various complications, the wisdom of
Feldman's proposal comes down to these three inquiries. Is there a plausible
63. However, it does not appear that he accepts the modest limits I propose in GREENAWALT,
NONESTABLISHMENT, supra note 3, chs. 23-24, as a matter of political philosophy and
constitutional law.
64. In respect to reliance on religious grounds in politics, my fullest treatments are in KENT
GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995)
RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).

and

KENT GREENAWALT,

65. FELDMAN, supra note 28, at 237.
66. Of course, if the expressed purpose of a law is to declare the government's support of a
religious point of view, that purpose would now be invalid. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the government violates the Establishment
Clause if its "actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion"). However, it could be all right
under Feldman's proposal.
67. I believe the main constraint is on expressed relevance.
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constitutional theory to support greater permissiveness about religious
expressions by government and greater restrictions on funding, even when
the aid is supplied according to neutral criteria? Does funding promise to be
as divisive as Feldman suggests and would the denial of funding to religious
endeavors constitute an unjust discrimination? Are government expressions
of religious views as unthreatening as Feldman asserts?
Feldman has provided us a plausible constitutional theory that is more
than an ad hoc compromise between competing armies in a culture war. The
dangers of discord are real in respect to the funding of schools.68 For other
social services (lacking an analogue to pervasive public schools), religious
organizations have a substantial claim of justice to be treated like other private organizations, and the very significant funding they have already
received has not been highly divisive. At least if these organizations do not
discriminate in admissions or employment and secular alternatives are
available, I would not expect continued funding to be very divisive in the
future.69 I do not think religious expressions by government are as innocuous
as Feldman claims, 70 a point we can examine more fully as we turn to the
approach of Professors Eisgruber and Sager.
IV.

Equal Liberty

Eisgruber and Sager propose a basic approach to both Religion Clauses
that they call Equal Liberty.
They reject (in principle at least) the
"dominant" view that religion should be privileged in some respects and
disfavored in others, and they also reject as misleading and unhelpful the
dominant metaphor of "separation of church and state.'
The two guiding
principles of their own approach are that (1) "no members of our political
community ought to be devalued on account of the spiritual foundations of
their important commitments and projects" and (2) "all members ... ought to
enjoy rights of free speech, personal autonomy, associative freedom and private property that, while neither uniquely relevant to religion nor defined in
terms of religion, will allow a broad range of religious beliefs and practices
to flourish. 72 A crucial aspect of this approach is that the only basis to give
religion special benefits or disabilities is a concern about inequality and
discrimination.7 3 "Equal Liberty... denies that religion is a constitutional
anomaly, a category of human experience that demands special benefits
and/or necessitates special restrictions. 74

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See GREENAWALT, NONESTABLISHMENT, supra note 3, ch. 19.
See id. ch. 18.
See id. chs. 5-6.
EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 5-7.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 6-9.
Id. at 6.
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Eisgruber and Sager, with important qualifications, thus approve the
Court's movement toward neutrality, in the sense of same treatment, as the
key to both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. As the Supreme
Court held in Employment Division v. Smith,75 people with religious reasons
to engage in forbidden behavior should, in general, have no special right to
violate laws of general application.76 For Eisgruber and Sager, statutes that
provide such rights across a wide range of subjects, such as the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 77 and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),78 are seriously misguided and
indeed unconstitutional in whole or part.79 When it comes to financial aid,
religious groups may benefit if they fall within a larger category of
beneficiaries and the legislature is not aiming particularly to assist some
religious endeavors over others or religious endeavors over nonreligious
ones.80 Thus, the Supreme Court correctly accepted the principle that a state
may grant substantial vouchers for parochial schools among others. 8' And,
whatever may be true of education for the ministry in isolation, Locke v.
Davey' S82 approval of a state's refusal to fund religious education for the
ministry should not be extended to broader constraints on aid to sectarian
education.83 The upshot would be that, across most of their coverage, state
Blaine Amendments should
be treated as unconstitutional because they dis84
religion.
against
criminate
In their fundamental concern that members of the political community
not be devalued on account of their spiritual foundations and commitments,
Eisgruber and Sager echo Justice O'Connor's rationale for her endorsement
test. 85 They would be even less accepting than she was of government

75. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
76. Id. at 885.
77. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to
2000bb-4 (2000)), invalidated inpartby City ofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000).
79. RFRA was fundamentally flawed, they argue, in relieving religious organizations and
individuals of burdens others must share. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 264. In its
application to local zoning regulations, RLUIPA suffers from the same defect, but its treatment of
prisoners' claims may be justified as a response to discrimination by prison officials. Id. at 269-70.
80. Id. at 200-16.
81. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
82. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
83. Eisgruber and Sager consider and reject the appropriateness in this context of judicial
reliance on a prophylactic theory that would allow a state to forbid all aid to religious education in
order to prevent favoritism toward religion. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 227-32.
84. Blaine Amendments typically prohibit state governments from providing financial support
to religious worship, exercise, or instruction and mandate that schools receiving public support be
free of sectarian control or influence. See generally Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and
Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins, Scope, and FirstAmendment Concerns, 26 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 551 (2003).
85. Lynch v. Donnelley, 465 U.S. 668, 688, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
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sponsorship of religious messages. 86 In respect both to religious expressions
by government and financial aid to religious entities, Eisgruber and Sager
sharply oppose Noah Feldman's positions.87 We need to consider who is
right, or whether each view captures a part of the truth.
Answering critics who have claimed that their view is inconsistent with
the historical understanding of the Religion Clauses, Eisgruber and Sager
note that members of the founding generation often spoke of equal liberty,
and that "one purpose of the religion clauses was to protect religions from
discrimination." 88 "Equal Liberty's historical pedigree is pretty good," they
say. 89 Well, that depends on what one demands of a pedigree. The concern
about discrimination against minority religions was one aspect of free exercise clauses in state constitutions and of the federal Religion Clauses, but that
concern accompanied a view that religion was distinctive and specially
important, just what Eisgruber and Sager deny. To take just two illustrations,
some state constitutions, as well as Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance,
spoke of a duty to worship God, 90 and although the idea of excusing religious
pacifists from military duty had a wide appeal, few would have extended this
privilege to those whose pacifism was based on nonreligious conscience. 9'
The best that can be said for the historical pedigree of Equal Liberty is that it
draws upon one historical strand and disregards others. Such an exercise can
be justified only if the result well fits modern conditions and understandings,
and that indeed is the authors' overarching claim of support.
Eisgruber and Sager urge that the dominant view, which recommends
special privileges and special disabilities for religion, is "a surefire recipe for
inconsistency., 92 The "distinction between removing a burden and conferring a benefit is vanishingly thin, if not purely semantic. 93 When it comes to

political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.").
86. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 134, 147-52.

87. See, e.g., id. at 156 (dismissing Feldman's position on religious expression by government
as "simply naive"). Compare id. at 200-08 (taking the position that governmental funding may
benefit religious groups without affront to principles of Equal Liberty, as long as the conditions of
"genuine secular alternative" and "nonpreferentialism" are satisfied), with Feldman, supra note 28,
at 247 (arguing that government funding of any social program that relies on faith to accomplish its
goals amounts to governmental sponsorship of the religious mission of that church and a violation
of the "tradition of institutional separation").
88. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 72.
89. Id. at 71.
90. See GREENAWALT, FREE EXERCISE, supra note 2, at 17-18 (reprinting the provisions in the
Maryland and Massachusetts constitutions); MADISON, supra note 43, at 30 ("It is the duty of every
man to render to the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him.").
91. McConnell remarks that some members of Congress considering the possibility of a
constitutional exemption did not want it to go to "those who are of no religion." McConnell,
Singling Out, supra note 5, at 12-13 (internal quotation marks omitted). Probably, many people did
not even imagine nonreligious pacifists.
92. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 29.
93. Id. at 25.
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privileges, courts must engage in an impossible balancing act. Equal Liberty,
by contrast, provides a clear principle of decision, they assert. They
recognize that some cases will be difficult and arguable under Equal Liberty,
but they are far from retracting their claims that it is much more coherent and
manageable than the no hindrance-no aid approach.94
Without here analyzing the coherence and difficulty of application of
the no hindrance-no aid approach, I inquire whether Eisgruber and Sager
manage to stick faithfully to their own claimed principles and whether these
principles actually permit much more straightforward judgments than does
the dominant view. The difficulties I identify cast strong doubt on whether
Equal Liberty is a viable approach as the one controlling standard for adjudication under the Religion Clauses.
We begin by considering Equal Liberty as it relates to religious
expressions by government in the form of public displays and teaching in
public schools. Crucial questions are whether public displays of majority
religious ideas and traditions do make members of minorities feel devalued,
and whether Eisgruber and Sager can explain either why religion is
distinctive in respect to government expression or what other subjects
besides religion should receive similar treatment. Without doubt, Eisgruber
and Sager's position follows more closely from the modem drift toward concem for disadvantaged members of society than does Feldman's.
Feldman is on to an important truth when he claims that non-Christians
may have very different attitudes toward Christian symbolism. 95 Some, like
himself, raised as an Orthodox Jew, may not find the occasional Christian
symbol troubling. And, one might add that when non-Christians choose to
immigrate to a country they know is dominantly Christian, they can hardly be
surprised or dismayed about occasional public recognition of that fact.
Similarly, immigrants who believe in no God or in many gods should not be
surprised at symbolic recognitions of a single God. But different people react differently. Some, perhaps less self-confident and secure than Feldman,
will feel more like outsiders when they come across government expressions
of monotheism and Christianity. When Feldman asserts that it is an
"interpretive choice" to feel excluded, 96 he makes this attitude more
voluntary and more trivial than it is for many people, especially children.
Eisgruber and Sager call the strategy of telling offended parties to react
differently "naive," because "[p]eople do feel excluded when the government
endorses one or another religion, whether they ought to or not., 97 And the
idea that people shouldn't complain if they get what they expect can carry us
only so far. If I were working for an oil company and were sent to Saudi
Arabia, I would not expect to be permitted to engage in Christian worship in

94. Id. at 87, 93, 119.
95. See supranotes 52-54 and accompanying text.
96. FELDMAN, supra note 28, at 242.
97. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 156.
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public, but I would certainly feel like an outsider and I would not think that
country's approach to religious liberty was warranted. For as long as our
country has existed, immigrants of various kinds could expect government
discrimination according to race, gender, religion, ethnic origin, and sexual
preference; but constitutional principles about equality should more nearly
reflect the country's aspirations than its actual performance. If a dominant
principle now is that people should be considered as equal regardless of race,
gender, ethnic origin, sexual preference, or religious identity, the sense of
exclusion engendered by government expressions of religious ideas is a
cause for serious concern, whatever the intensity of the feelings of most
outsiders.
The problem of whether and why religion might receive special
treatment in regard to public displays and teaching in public school is raised
by Eisgruber and Sager's claim that only concerns about discrimination can
justify such treatment. 98 The authors accept the prevailing view that public
schools cannot teach that particular religious ideas are true or false. 99 They
square this position with their general thesis by pointing to characteristic
features of religion and by suggesting other ideas that government would be
barred from teaching, 100 but this twofold strategy is less than fully successful.
In their chapter on religious symbols, Eisgruber and Sager suggest that
Americans are highly sensitive to their religious identities and that "public
endorsements of religion carry a special charge or valence."' 0 ' At the end of
their chapter on public schools, they write that Equal Liberty does not deny
that a ground may exist for treating religion specially; that ground is "the
0 2
vulnerability of conscience to discrimination, mistreatment, and neglect."'1
In the same chapter they indicate other ideas that public schools could not
teach, such as partisan political ideas. They generalize that "the Constitution
protects schoolchildren from the imposition of orthodoxy, religious or
not,"'10 3 and comment that "the restrictions0 on
religion in the schools are not
4
so unusual as people sometimes suppose."'
Although the Supreme Court has not decided such a case, were a public
school teacher to continually express explicitly racist or sexist ideas, that
would be one form of a violation of equal protection, and were such a teacher
to praise the Republican Party as evidently superior to the Democrats, that
might violate a principle of freedom of speech, or of our Constitution taken

98. See. e.g., id. at 197 ("Equal Liberty insists on the need for special constitutional solicitude
toward religion in the name of equality; what it denies is that religion should suffer special
constitutionally rooted disabilities or enjoy special constitutionally rooted advantages as against
other deep human concerns and commitments.").
99. Id. at 180-81.
100. Id. at 182-83, 191-92.
101. Id. at 126.
102. Id. at 197.
103. Id. at 171.
104. Id. at 197.
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more broadly in its assurance of free voting. But public schools are free to
take positions on many controversial issues: that the war in Iraq is justified or
not justified; that our early settlers, by and large, did or did not treat Native
Americans fairly; that immigrants do or do not contribute to the overall vitality of the country; that all citizens should or should not have to learn to
speak English; that abortions are or are not a tragedy in women's lives; that
abstinence from sex is or is not desirable for teenagers; or that the national
government should or should not be making much more strenuous efforts to
protect the environment. 105 In brief, various organs of government, including
public school teachers, may express positions on many issues in ways that
would involve forbidden viewpoint discrimination were the same government to include and exclude private speakers from a public forum on similar
grounds based on their positions about such issues.
How are we to square such freedom in respect to other subjects with
much more severe restrictions on teaching religious ideas? One possibility is
to deny that teaching on any of these other subjects is as likely to involve
discrimination or to touch the core identities of students and their families.
That strikes me as implausible, and Eisgruber and Sager do not quite claim
otherwise. A second possibility is that our notions of what public schools
may teach as true and sound need to be much more restrictive than they are
now. Perhaps across a wide range of topics, schools should have to teach
about various understandings as they may teach about religious
understandings, eschewing claims of truth in favor of one position or its
competitors. Such "neutral" teaching may often be desirable pedagogically,
but it would be a huge stride to conclude that it is constitutionally required
across the range of topics that touch important personal identities and raise
serious concerns about discrimination. Eisgruber and Sager do not explicitly
assert that position. Finally, one might conclude that the public schools
should be able to do more teaching about religious truth, bringing their
ability in respect to that subject in accord with what they may say on other
sensitive topics. Eisgruber and Sager do not hint at recommending such a
radical shift concerning religion.
Exactly how they mean to deal with this issue is less important than the
more straightforward inference one might draw from the widely assumed
asymmetry about government's role in regard to controversial topics. It is
this: There are important reasons for the government to stay out of the realm
of religious truth apart from a concern about discrimination. Notably, governments are woefully incompetent judges of truth in religion.' 0 6 This
provides some evidence that Equal Liberty should not be, cannot be, all there
is to the Religion Clauses.

105. See McConnell, Singling Out, supra note 5, at 9-10, 26-28 (noting that the government,
including public schools, is free to join its voice in the public debate and take controversial
positions on issues, while not being able to take such positions with respect to religion).

106. Id. at 23-24.
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The Eisgruber-Sager approach to financial aid is, in its main outlines,
much simpler, but it presents its own difficulties. The basic notion is that
organizations need not be denied assistance, available to others, because they
are religious.' 0 7 Thus, if aid is being given to schools, hospitals, and
addiction programs, religious groups may be treated like other private
organizations. (The authors do indicate that a state may choose to prefer
secular private schools, in the sense of schools not based on a religious or
other exclusionary perspective, over schools that privilege religious,
ideological, cultural, or ethnic subgroups. 0 8)
The perplexities with what Eisgruber and Sager say about financial aid
concern the following issues: (1) Could aid go to religious groups explicitly
for religious purposes?; (2) Must the state supply a secular alternative if only
religious groups come forward to qualify for aid?; (3) What constraints, if
any, may states place on the content of religious teaching in private schools
receiving public funds?
The authors focus on aid for secular purposes such as education or
health care. Suppose, instead, legislatures made a judgment that people's
involvement in religious groups is particularly good for their personal and
civic lives. Grants are made directly to religious groups to be used as parts
of their general budgets. If the only worry about financial aid to religion is
discrimination, and the program is well designed to treat all religious groups
equally, say by keying assistance to the number of active members, it would
create no substantial problem about discrimination among religions.' 0 9 In
answer to a concern about discrimination against nonreligious views, the
grants might extend to atheist and agnostic groups and other groups dedicated to carrying out philosophies of life." 10 According to the present
understanding of the Establishment Clause (and according to McConnell,
Laycock, and Feldman), such aid definitely would not be all right,"' but its

107. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 200-04.
108. Id. at 219.
109. Of course any formula will have the effect of helping some religions more than others, and
there could be divisive struggles over the right formula, but this would not mean that every formula
raises a serious concern about discrimination.
110. Insofar as the concern about discrimination was connected back to the founding
generation, most of its members were not worried about unfavorable treatment for atheists and
agnostics. See Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2093-94 (1996) (discussing the history of the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which has permitted certain government practices embracing
religion from the time of the Founders' invocation of Divine guidance); Alesia Maltz, Commentary
on the HarrisSuperquarry Inquiry, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 793, 814-15 (1994-1995) (discussing the
pervasiveness of religion in eighteenth-century political discourse); Jonathan Belcher, Note,
Religion-Plus Speech: The Constitutionality of Juror Oaths and Affirmations under the First
Amendment, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 287, 293 (1992) (discussing the Founders' views that only
Christians and others who believed in God were competent to serve as witnesses and jurors).
11l.See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion) (allowing aid to religious
education, but only if the aid is "neutrally available" and at least "figuratively" passes through the
hands of private citizens who could direct it elsewhere); id. at 836-913 (concurring and dissenting
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status would seem much more doubtful under Equal Liberty. That Eisgruber
and Sager omit treatment of this possibility may be further evidence that
concerns about discrimination are not all that underlie the Religion Clauses.
At the least, the omission obscures a potential objection to the proposal that
Equal Liberty stands alone.
Eisgruber and Sager suggest that in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris1 l2 the
Court rightly focused on whether the voucher plan treated "parents and
children with different religious convictions equally," ' 13 and, drawing on the
work of Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle, they conclude that the issue of an ade14
quate secular alternative was more difficult than the Justices admitted.'
The general public schools in Cleveland were of poor quality; parents had an
adequate secular alternative only if the nonreligious private schools receiving
vouchers, plus special programs in the public schools, sufficed.1 15 Eisgruber
and Sager comment that for Equal Liberty, "the existence of a genuine secular alternative is the heart of the issue."'1 6 Why they take this position about
an adequate secular alternative is not entirely clear.
Let us assume that, as in the Ohio program, the government's criteria
for assistance to private endeavors are nonpreferential, that none of the
religious groups receiving assistance use discriminatory standards of
admission to their programs, and that the state is also providing the service in
question, however poorly. Initially, the state, with a drug rehabilitation program that is not very successful and has too many participants, offers to
provide a substantial subsidy for any private group that proposes an effective
program. Only two groups make proposals: one is evangelical Christian and
the other is nondenominational liberal Christian. Both groups propose to
make religion a significant feature of their programs. The state funds both
programs, which are quickly recognized to be much more effective than the
state-run one. Drug users who choose not to participate in a religious
program are no worse off than they would have been if those programs had

opinions) (arguing that "actual diversion" of government money to "religious indoctrination"
violates the Establishment Clause); FELDMAN, supra note 28, at 209 (asserting that "[tihe framers
meant the Establishment Clause primarily to guard against the possibility that a citizen's tax dollars
would be used to support religious teachings with which he might possibly disagree" even if those
funds were generally available for both religious and nonreligious activity); Laycock, supra note 6,
at 1005 (explaining that under his principle of "substantive neutrality" government benefits to
churches are permissible only if they are "incidental to a larger policy of neutrality" in which such
benefits are provided universally to both religious and nonreligious activities); McConnell,
Crossroads,supra note 5, at 184 (noting that when the government provides financial support only
for churches, it aids religion in violation of the neutrality principle). One might think any favoritism
of organized efforts to promote philosophies of life would discriminate against more informal,
individual approaches.
112. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
113. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 213.
114. Id. at 215-16 (citing Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle
Look at Government Vouchers and SectarianService Providers, 18 J.L. & POL. 539, 577 (2002)).

115. Id. at 214.
116. Id. at 215.

2007]

How Does "Equal Liberty" Fare in Relation?

1237

not received funding.
They can still use the (now somewhat less
overburdened) state program.
If the only concern is about likely
discrimination in regard to religion, why is it not enough that the state has
offered the funds according to nonpreferential criteria?' 17 Of course, one
might say, as Eisgruber and Sager do, that the absence of an adequate secular
program will push some people toward religious programs whose ideas they
do not embrace,'' 8 but that is not directly a matter of discrimination.' 19
Eisgruber and Sager may believe that an adequate secular alternative is
needed as a prophylactic against covert attempts to promote religion, or in
order to avoid the impression that the state is promoting religion,'2 0 but they
do not develop either of those points against possible challenges.121
My final point in regard to financial aid involves what restrictions states
may place on what funded schools teach. As we have seen, Feldman suggests that if states fund religious schools, they must do so on an even basis
and cannot refuse, according to the law as it has developed, to aid a school
because it teaches "racism, or anti-Americanism, or sexism."'' 22 Recall that
Ohio's voucher plan did preclude teaching of hostility based on religion or
race. 23 Although a state cannot discriminate in dispensing aid on the basis
of the theological propositions of a religion, 24 the condition of aid in Ohio's
plan strongly suggests that a state may require that a school's ethical and political teachings not be wholly at odds with premises of our liberal
democracy. Eisgruber and Sager do not discuss this issue. If the only concern is about discrimination, the inquiry should be whether state restrictions
on forms of teaching constitute some kind of discrimination. Presumably
more would need to be shown than that some religious groups actually do

117. If the only group coming forward had a particular view about how recovering addicts
should live-say telephoning a counselor and a family member every day after they leave the
program-a program with an alternative approach would not be required.
118. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 207-08.
119. If the government had never directly provided a certain kind of service and decided it
should license private providers, the fact that in some areas the only private providers were religious
would not make the government licensing discriminatory. Why should funding be different?
120. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 214-16 (noting that "[s]ome people might
suspect that Cleveland's voucher program had been gerrymandered to benefit religious schools").
121. One assumes they would allow tax exemptions for churches even if these allow churches
to put on attractive social events that would be more expensive when hosted by organizations
paying taxes.
I agree with Lupu and Tuttle that the reasons for an adequate secular alternative are not wholly
encompassed by concerns about discrimination; in particular, the government should not (even
inadvertently and without apparent sponsorship) push people toward religious programs with its
financial resources. See GREENAWALT, NONESTABLISHMENT, supra note 3, chs. 18-19; Ira C.
Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers and
Sectarian Service Providers, 18 J.L. & POL. 539, 596-97 (2002).
122. FELDMAN, supra note 28, at 246.

123. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ("The clearest command of the
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over
another.").
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want to engage in the kind of teaching that is disallowed. However, the concern here goes beyond discrimination to whether the government impedes
religious liberty by setting up standards for instruction about morals and
politics with which religious groups wanting state assistance for their schools
must comply. 2 5
The most significant test for Equal Liberty may be the question of
accommodations of religious exercise. 126 Eisgruber and Sager squarely
acknowledge that their approach will introduce difficult questions of
evaluation; 127 nevertheless, by initially comparing their own basic principle
against the complexities of the dominant alternative and then introducing
nuances one by one, mainly as responses to actual and possible critiques,
they tend to overstate the comparative clarity of their own approach. Their
neglect of some of the hardest cases for their perspective has a similar effect.
The crucial issues about accommodation of religion come in three
forms: (1) When, if ever, is accommodation constitutionally required?; (2)
When may legislatures choose to afford an accommodation for people with
religious reasons not to comply with laws?; and (3) When, if an
accommodation is supplied for religious exercise, must it also be extended to
other reasons not to comply, and what other reasons must enjoy similar
treatment? Thus, to take the central facts of Employment Division v. Smith,
must governments with laws prohibiting the use of peyote permit its use by
members of a church for whom that is the central aspect of their worship
service? The Supreme Court answered "no."' 128 May states choose to create
an exemption for members of a single church or for all religious groups engaging in similar use? The Court's opinion in Smith indicated clearly that
was constitutionally permissible. 129 However, if a legislative accommodation
imposes too severely on others, as did Connecticut's requirement that employers give leave to all their employees who wished a day off on their
Sabbath, the law becomes an impermissible establishment of religion. 130 If
religious use is protected directly by the Free Exercise Clause (contrary to
what the Smith Court held) or may be protected by legislative action (in
accord with what the Court said), what other uses, if any, must also be
protected? Such a privilege cannot go to one church and be denied to otherwise similar churches.13 1 Whether it could be denied to nonreligious groups
that claim that peyote provides unique insights about life or to people who

125. GREENAWALT, NONESTABLISHMENT, supra note 3, ch. 19.
126. That subject forms a large part of GREENAWALT, FREE EXERCISE, supra note 2, and
chapters 16 and 17 of GREENAWALT, NONESTABLISHMENT, supra note 3.
127

EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1,at 119.

128. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
129. Id.
130. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
131. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. I pass over here what should count as
otherwise similar churches, whether for example, long continuity and a high retention of members
could play a role as it seemed to do in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219, 227 (1972).
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use peyote to reduce acute physical pain is less certain, but the Supreme
Court's opinions suggest that such distinctions are generally permissible.
The most important of these opinions are in Wisconsin v. Yoder, which
indicated that the constitutional privilege of the Amish to withdraw children
from school did not extend to the Henry Thoreaus of the world, 32 and in
cases upholding the favored treatment of religious exercise by federal
statutes that cover religious claims in general but do not cover analogous

nonreligious ones. 133

A fourth question about accommodation that lies in the background of
many cases and has occasionally been explicitly addressed by the Supreme
Court is what distinguishes an accommodation of religious exercise
(permitted if it does not impose too severely on others) from forbidden
134
promotion or advancement of religion. In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
for example, the Court held that special tax privileges
for religious periodi35
cals were unjustified favoritism, not accommodation.'
The determination in Smith to deny constitutional protection to strong
claims of religious exercise was highly controversial, and I believe it was
misguided. Without endorsing the Court's ruling, Eisgruber and Sager
strongly disagree with its scholarly critics. They claim that the only basis to
exempt exercises of religion from generally valid laws is the concern about
discrimination, a matter of "protection.' 3 6 Scholars and others who believe
that religion should enjoy a special "privilege" are mistaken.' 3 For this
reason, they also sharply oppose legislative choices to create privileges
for
38
do.
RFRAs
state
and
RLUIPA,
RFRA,
as
general,
in
exercise
religious
In addition to this "in principle" objection, they argue that the privilegebalancing approach is defective, because it requires courts to assess the
degree of impairment of religious exercise and the strength of state interests
and to decide whether the interests are strong enough to warrant the
impairments. 39 If courts really required that a state, in order to restrict
religiously motivated behavior, must have an interest that is compelling,
much too much religious action would be protected; states should, for
example, be able to subject churches to ordinary zoning regulations without

132. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16.
133. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Unio do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006)
(holding that the federal government's ban on the sacramental use of hoasca violated RFRA); Cutter
v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (holding that § 3 of RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000),
which provides protection of prisoners' religious rights, does not violate the Establishment Clause).
134. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
135. Id. at 5 (plurality opinion).
136. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1,at 95.
137. Id. The distinction between privilege and protection is central in an earlier article of theirs.
See Eisgruber & Sager, Vulnerability, supra note 4.
138. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note I, at 246, 257-74.
139. Id. at 86.
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having to show that their need to do so is genuinely compelling. 40 To be
plausible, a balancing formula would have to contain a proportionality standard "sensitive to the nature and weight of the burden imposed on religious
exercise as well as to the gravity of the state's interest," but as one moves
away from a strict compelling interest test, "a good deal of indeterminacy
and ad hockery enters the picture.' 4 1 Without a clear standard, judges and
other officials will be likely to favor familiar claims of conscience over
unfamiliar ones. "These problems are symptoms of a deeper
pathology: the
142
balancing approach lacks a coherent normative foundation."'
Eisgruber and Sager offer an alternative that they believe is cleaner
conceptually and more manageable judicially. Everything comes down to
the concern about discrimination. Claims of religious exercise should enjoy
constitutional protection if there is a serious risk that the claimants are
suffering discrimination. 43 Legislatures properly grant exemptions when
they are attempting to treat particular religious claims fairly in relation to
other behavior that society allows, thus avoiding discrimination. 144 The central focus on discrimination both for problems typically classed as "aid" and
for those conceived as "accommodation" would obviate the need for courts
to use any independent criteria of when purported accommodation slides into
impermissible promotion. 45 Fair treatment and avoidance of discrimination
would also determine what analogous behavior must be treated like
religiously46motivated behavior that is exempted from ordinary standards of
behavior. 1

Whatever attractive simplicity this approach may appear to possess
largely unravels when one comes to many practical applications. Try as hard
as they do to face up to the difficult issues, Eisgruber and Sager do not always succeed. They do recognize that many religious activities are elective,
not compulsory, and that some practices may be seen as substitutable for
others. 147 But they tend to neglect these insights when they undertake most
of their comparisons between religious and nonreligious reasons for action.
Although in fundamental sympathy with Justice Scalia's attack on the
balancing approach of pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence, Eisgruber and
Sager adopt a position toward free exercise claims that is both more generous
and more complex than Smith's. In their view, for the legal prohibition of
peyote to be validly applied against use in worship, it is not enough that the

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 85.

Id.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 88-97.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 103.
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law has a rational purpose, and is general and neutrally applicable148-the
Smith standard. If the law would not have been adopted except for the
insensitivity of legislators to their religious use of peyote, members of the
Native American Church could succeed on a claim that they have been victims of a kind of discrimination. A crucial comparison would be with
Prohibition laws that provide exemptions for use of wine for sacramental
purposes. 149 The authors recognize that peyote might reasonably be regarded
as more dangerous than alcohol, 50 and its use thereby more damaging to
state interests, but the Constitution, they say, requires accommodation if the
"failure to accommodate bespeaks a failure of equal regard."''5 It sounds as
if the peyote users should succeed if they can show that the quantum of danger from the two substances is about equal, and at one point Eisgruber and
Sager write that in the absence of a nonreligious analogue, a court can ask
"the counterfactual question of whether
more mainstream concerns would
' 52
have been treated more favorably."'
What are we to make, from the standpoint of Equal Liberty, of failures
to forbid firmly entrenched practices that are dangerous? Let us consider
first a prohibition without exemption. All use of cocaine is forbidden.
Someone says the law reflects a discrimination against cocaine users as compared with cigarette smokers, because tobacco cigarettes are more dangerous
than cocaine. The comparison here is far from perfect, because the kinds of
dangers are not comparable, but suppose the implicit answer from the legislators is, "Yes, we agree cigarettes are worse. If we were starting from
scratch, we would outlaw all smoking of cigarettes, but largely ignorant of
their danger, people in vast numbers started smoking. Even aware of the
danger, many find it extremely hard to stop. Were we to prohibit all cigarette
smoking, we would make a large proportion of our citizens into criminals,
and enforcement problems like those during Prohibition would be severe.
We are hoping that few enough people now use cocaine that a prohibition
may work reasonably effectively." This is a plausible rationale for treating
cocaine less favorably than cigarettes that does not depend on the comparative damage the two products will cause.
Legislators could adopt a similar rationale about exemptions: "We can't
succeed with any prohibition that bars use of a substance called for by
religions to which a high proportion of our citizens belong. If we could
stamp out use of alcohol in worship services we would; we believe we can
succeed in respect to peyote."
What matters here is not the factual

148. Id. at 95-96 (stating that the Smith standard, though partly correct, fails because it lacks a
more robust and articulate principle of equality).
149. Id. at 92.
150. Id. at 92-93. More precisely, alcohol might be less dangerous in the amounts used for
sacramental purposes.
151. Id. at 93.
152. Id. at 106.
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plausibility of this argument, but its structure. Some acts are legally accepted
just because they have been a part of our culture for so long. A legislature
might reasonably choose to forbid other acts that are no more dangerous, because they think the prohibition may work.
Does this show a failure of equal regard to those who want to engage in
the forbidden acts? If it is a failure, it is one that may be justified in terms of
effective laws. There is room in what Eisgruber and Sager say to conclude
that it would not count as a failure of equal regard. The legislators are not
treating those who worship with peyote worse because they are unfamiliar or
unsympathetic with their commitments, or because they
devalue those
"commitments on the basis of their spiritual foundations."' 153
Whether or not one characterizes the legislative approach here as failing
in equal regard, the crucial point of the example is that the relevant
constitutional comparison cannot be exclusively in terms of relative danger.
To be faithful to an Equal Liberty approach, judges might be able to estimate
whether legislators did honestly adopt the rationale I have suggested (or
would have if it had occurred to them). At one point Eisgruber and Sager
say, "The question is whether a government that was alert and sympathetic in
principle to the religiously inspired interests of a particular minority faith
could have fashioned the contested disparity in accommodation."' 154 That
sounds less like a guess about what actual legislators did think about why to
treat the uncommon religious practice less favorably than the common
practice-a difficult surmise at best-than an inquiry about what reasonable
legislators might have thought. But how can we know why reasonable legislators might have decided against an exemption if comparative danger is
not the exclusive key? The obvious way would be to assess the infringement
on religious exercise against the strength of the government's reasons to
prohibit. That might tell us whether reasonable legislators would have been
unsympathetic to the minority or prudently trying to stamp out a harmful
practice despite sympathy for its practitioners. The problem is that this
inquiry looks very much like the kind of balancing against which55Eisgruber
and Sager rail, a "benighted quest" that "Equal Liberty forsakes."'1
Responding to a possible challenge that there are no secular analogues
to religiously based noncompliance with dress codes, the authors agree that
secular moral commitments will rarely be comparable to such religious
duties, but Equal Liberty will "call for exemptions in most dress code cases"
because the "burdens imposed in such cases are especially likely to result
from neglect."' 156 If legislatures or administrators fairly considered the
imposition on members of minority religions of a uniform dress code, they
would have made exceptions. Here we run into two significant complexities

153.
154.
155.
156.
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to which Eisgruber and Sager do not advert. It might be that the reason not
to make a particular exception-say for girls in school wearing head
scarves-is that usage reflects and conveys (for some people) a prescribed
role for women that does not correspond to liberal democratic values.'57
Does that constitute a failure of equal regard? The more powerful the state's
reason not to grant an exemption, the less its unwillingness to do so will appear to deny equal regard; but this inquiry throws us back into the
uncomfortable assessment of religious need against state interest.
The second complexity in regard to dress codes is that one needs to
consider forms of dress that are motivated but not required by one's religion.
In one case a prisoner wished to wear a cross despite a ban on all wearing of
jewelry; he did not think he had to wear a cross but he regarded doing so as a
valuable expression of his faith. 58 For many individuals who wish to deviate
from prescribed dress, their chosen form of dress may reflect a strong sense
of their personal identity (e.g., a nonconformist) and perhaps a political
position (as long hair once upon a time reflected a rejection of militarism).
When one reflects on these comparisons, it becomes difficult to say which
failures to exempt religious claims to be excepted from dress codes should be
matters of constitutional right. One might conclude that only forms of dress
that are mandated by one's religion should receive constitutional protection,
but that would require courts to discern whether individuals regarded standards of dress, such as wearing a beard, as mandatory or merely desirable.
The crucial comparison between religious and nonreligious reasons for
exemptions comes up again when the issue is whether a nonreligious claim
should receive the same treatment as a religious one. Here the question is not
whether some religious claims are neglected; rather, it is whether a claim is
favored because it is religious, something the principle of equal regard does
not allow. 159 Eisgruber and Sager propose that nonreligious moral claims
must be treated similarly to religious claims. 160 Thus, a nonreligious pacifist
who objects to military service or work on armaments must be treated like a
religious pacifist. However, a hypothetical Mother Sherbert, unwilling to
work on Saturday because she cannot find adequate child care, would not be
entitled to unemployment compensation that went to the actual Ms. Sherbert,
a Seventh-Day Adventist who could not work on Saturday as a matter of

157. That the "meaning" of head scarves is highly variable and controversial is eloquently
illustrated in ORHAN PAMUK, SNOW (Maureen Freely trans., Faber & Faber 2004) (2002).
158. Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429, 1436-37 (W.D. Wis. 1995), aff'd, 91 F.3d 1018
(7th Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997).
159. Although their theory would seem to authorize it, Eisgruber and Sager do not discuss this
possible argument for a nonreligious claim for exemption: There is a certain kind of religious claim
that has not received a legislative exemption because of neglect. It must, therefore, receive an
exemption (though no such claim has actually been made) and our analogous claim must be treated
similarly.
160. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 112-18.
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religious conscience. 1 61 Mother Sherbert does not experience an inflexible
judge that parents who try hard
obligation, and the state may permissibly
62
care.
child
adequate
find
enough will
One crucial consideration when courts decide whether analogous
nonreligious claims should receive an exemption that tracks that given to
religious claims is whether a standard for decision is administrable. For
dress code issues, it is usually simpler to trace a religious basis than to weigh
the connection to personal identity and political conviction of an individual
who wishes to violate the rules. Eisgruber and Sager appear to give little
weight to this factor,' although they do say that what counts is a rule-maker's
"stance or attitude, 163 and, as I have already suggested, legislators who vary
their responses to different claims based on whether an exemption is reasonably workable might be thought to be acting with equal regard.
In respect to a person's unwillingness to work on Saturday, Eisgruber
and Sager might profitably have considered the following variations. Mother
Sherbert (R) and Mother Sherbert (S)deem it fundamentally important that
they spend weekend days with their children.' 64 Eisgruber and Sager write in
footnotes comparing religious and secular moral requirements that some persons recognize "their duties to care for their children" are "binding moral
strictures,"' 165 and that "caring for loved ones" may well be a secular interest
and commitment that is "serious" and "identity-defining.' ' 66 For many of
these people, paying someone else to do the job will not meet their perceived
obligation. Eisgruber and Sager apparently acknowledge that a secular
Mother Sherbert (S)might feel an obligation not to work on Saturday that
compares in strength and sense of compulsion with that of the Seventh-day
Adventist. 167
In thinking about which women should have a constitutional right to be
given unemployment compensation despite an unwillingness to meet the
general requirement of being willing to work on Saturday, we begin with the
161. Id. at 116-17 (comparing their hypothetical woman with the successful claimant in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
162. Id. The authors say that a state's determination "does not.., involve any imposition on
religious freedom," id. at 117, but the issue here is whether the state is unfairly favoring religious
freedom over moral freedom.
163. Id. at 300 n.37.
164. Against a possible critique that parents will not have this attitude, I can report that in the
years after my wife Sanja died, I thought the most important responsibility in my life was being
available for my children during evenings and at various school events. I was immensely fortunate
to have a job that allowed this.
165. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 301 n.39.
166. Id. at 300 n.37.
167. Their treatment of two women who feel a responsibility to operate soup kitchens is
relevant here. One is "impelled by her religious commitments," the other by "what she describes as
'adeep and abiding concern for those who suffer the misfortunes of poverty and hunger."' Id. at 54.
The authors suppose that the two women could have a similar sincerity and depth of commitment
and should be treated similarly, that their treatment should not turn on "the moral or religious
content" of their commitments. Id. at 55.
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assumption that the Seventh-day Adventist has such a right. For Eisgruber
and Sager, that is not because she wins according to a balancing approach; it
is because, when one considers the status of workers unwilling to work on
Sunday and the force of other reasons legislators recognize as excusing one
from ordinary requirements, the failure to treat the Seventh-day Adventist
similarly shows a neglect of her (minority) religious commitments. Once
those situated like the real Ms. Sherbert are to be protected, who else must be
similarly protected? We can assume with Eisgruber and Sager that no one
has a secular compulsion not to work on a particular day just because it is
that day of the week. That leaves us with Mother Sherbert (R) and Mother
Sherbert (S). Both feel very strongly that they should spend Saturday with
their children, R because of a religious sense of family obligations, S because
of a nonreligious sense that nothing in life is more important than personally
caring for one's children. I shall oversimplify a bit and assume that neither
thinks she has an absolute obligation to avoid work on Saturday-each
would rather work than suffer the alternatives of dying, languishing in prison,
or having her children taken away.168 If the law exempted everyone who felt
any responsibility to be with children on Saturday, it would punch a huge
hole in any requirement that a person must be willing to work on Saturday to
receive unemployment compensation.1 69 One might draw the line by
requiring an absolute commitment (thus excluding both Mother Sherberts),
by requiring a religious commitment (thus excluding S), by requiring a
commitment of a certain strength (thus treating R and S according to the degree of compulsion they feel to be with their children), or by requiring a
commitment that is both religious and very strong (thus excluding S and
leaving R's fate to the degree of compulsion she feels).
Eisgruber and Sager write as if the one line that should not be drawn is
between similar religious and nonreligious commitments, 170 but that line
might be supported by the argument that sincerity and depth of commitment
to be with children are much easier to measure when there is a claimed religious base. And how should a court view the claim of Mother Sherbert (R) if
legislators and administrators fail to grant her the exemption that goes to the
actual Ms. Sherbert? One might think that requiring that the perceived
obligation be unconditional and absolute, as was Ms. Sherbert's, does not
show disrespect for those whose idea of what they can do is more flexible;
168. The basic idea here is that the aim of being with one's children would be defeated by
certain consequences. One might conceivably believe one should never voluntarily give up
Saturdays with children-as one might believe one should never kill an innocent person-no matter
what, but it would be a peculiar attitude.
169. 1am not defending the view that a legislature should impose such a requirement.
170. In an earlier article, they suggested that the state could second-guess the "reasonability" of
secular claims for special treatment. Eisgruber & Sager, Vulnerability, supra note 4, at 1293.
Responding to a critique of McConnell, Singling Out, supra note 5, at 33-35, that uses the example
of religious and nonreligious strike-breakers, Eisgruber and Sager abandon that position, grounded
as it was on different epistemic bases for religious and nonreligious judgments. EISGRUBER &
SAGER, supra note 1, at 301 n.37.
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but one might, instead, believe that officials who do not grant R similar
treatment are yielding to claims supported by standard religious groups and
not treating with equal regard more nuanced, individual views of religious
obligations.
It is not my aim to figure out just how Equal Liberty solves the puzzle
of the various Sherberts, but two things are apparent. When Eisgruber and
Sager write that from the secular perspective that courts must adopt, "the
comparative force of religious and secular convictions is a matter for
empirical, scientific inquiry"' 71 and that "implausibly fine-grained
comparisons are not required by equal regard,"'' 72 they fail to acknowledge
how little may separate some applications of Equal Liberty from the
balancing they reject.
To judge the comparative complexity of Equal Liberty and the dominant
no hindrance-no aid approach, one would need to survey the wide range of
potential applications. I have certainly not proved that, overall, Equal
Liberty is as at least as complex in application as its rival. 173 What I have
shown in this Essay is sufficient to suggest that simplicity of application
should not be the main reason to select Equal Liberty. And a variety of the
nuances we have explored go some distance to demonstrate that Equal
Liberty disregards or downplays various considerations that should be
relevant to decision under the Religion Clauses. My overall conclusion is
that the factors Eisgruber and Sager make critical are indeed relevant for
understanding the scope of both clauses, and they have enriched the ways in
which judges and others may discern forms of explicit and implicit
discrimination; but it would be a misfortune for their proposal to replace all
other criteria for what government actions violate the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses.

171. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 1, at 103.
172. Id. at 300 n.37.
173. The two volumes of my study give a fair sense of how complex it is to apply the dominant
approach in various contexts. See GREENAWALT, FREE EXERCISE, supra note 2; GREENAWALT,
NONESTABLISHMENT, supra note 3.

